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There is an extensive literature on the different ways in which central government interferes in local 
government.  Within the UK, there appears to be a regular interference, with restructuring in the 
mid-1970s, the early 1990s, and a seemingly ongoing process over the last decade or so.  With a 
unitary constitution, any government - or, more accurately, any government using its parliamentary 
majority to push through legislation - can remould or even abolish local government. 
 
Yet with the introduction of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1990s, 
the newly created 'regional' assemblies and parliament were given varying degrees of power over 
local government.  The Welsh Assembly and Welsh Government were originally given secondary 
legislative powers in a discrete list of policy sectors, which included local government.  After a 
referendum in 2011, these secondary powers were changed to primary legislative powers. 
 
In Wales, there are a number of issues concerning restructuring local government.  These include the 
extent to which it is a party-political concern, with the Labour Party driving the reform agenda, as 
opposed to a Welsh Government drive.  The establishment of the Williams Commission into public 
sector reform, of which one component was local government, was presented as a public 
consultation exercise.  Yet the extent to which the Williams Report was in line with the position of 
the Labour Party over local government restructuring needs to be examined.   
 
The implementation of the plans to restructure local government in Wales was put on hold until 
after the 2016 elections to the Welsh Assembly, with the clear plan from the Labour Party of winning 
a mandate for implementation.  Interestingly, local government restructuring was not high on the 
election agenda.  A minority Labour Government was returned to power.  No potential coalition 
partner was willing to run with local government restructuring.  For now, that agenda appears to be 
on hold. 
 
This paper will assess the extent to which local government restructuring in Wales is driven from a 
party political base, as well as from a centralising 'regional' government.  Local government 
restructuring is not always driven from the 'national' centre, but can be driven from a 'regional' 




There is an extensive literature on the relationship between central government and local 
government in the UK.  Much of it focuses upon how the centre is able to dominate and influence 
local government (a sample of the literature includes Dearlove, 1979; Rhodes, 1981; Goldsmith and 
Newton, 1983; Dunleavy, 1984; Loughlin, 1996; Chisholm, 2000; Wilson, 2003; Bache and Flinders, 
2004).  The most obvious way in which the centre can interfere is with the threat of abolition.  The 
abolition of the metropolitan county councils and the Greater London Council in 1986 is clear 
evidence.  So there is a situation in the UK where the centre dominates local government.  Even local 
government elections are reported in the media along the lines of 'if this was a general election, the 
result would be...'  The UK is one of the most centralised countries in Europe if not beyond. 
 
Yet it must be noted this is the formal constitutional position of the UK.  With a unitary constitution, 
all power is focused on Parliament.  In the UK there is parliamentary sovereignty.  It is the corner 
stone of the UK constitution.  Parliament can pass any law it likes, and may not be bound by its 
predecessors.  Thus any law may be repealed by a future government using its parliamentary 
majority.  Local government has no constitutional protection whatsoever.  It can be created, 
restructured or abolished if central government can get its legislation through parliament.  There is a 
whole debate about the need for the constitutional protection of local government (see Copus, 
2017; Copus, 2016; Copus et al, 2017; House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee, 2012; John, 2014; Wilson & Game, 2011), but such a debate goes beyond the remit of 
this paper.  A short corollary here is that the devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland have as much constitutional protection as local government. 
 
When examining local government in Wales, the extent of central interference is clear (see Wilson 
and Game, 2011).  There was a restructuring in 1974, which saw the creation of a tiered system of 
local government.  This was carried out in tandem with a similar restructuring in England, and a 
separate one in Scotland a year later.  In Wales, eight county councils were created and 37 district 
councils.  There were parish or community councils as a third tier.  In 1996, this structure was 
changed to 22 unitary authorities (although the parish or community councils remained in place).  
Both of these restructurings of local government in Wales were centrally driven.  In the case of the 
latter restructuring, the then-Secretary of State for Wales, John Redwood, had the final decision on 
the structure of local government.  
 
The introduction of devolution by the Blair-led Labour Government in the late 1990s was presented 
as an attempt at decentralisation.  Parliament devolved power to sub-national government in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (and London).  The idea was to remove the centralising 
aspects of central government; to bring government closer to the people.  The relationship between 
central and local government in the areas where devolution was implemented would change 
significantly (see Wilson, 2003).  In the case of Scotland, where primary law making powers had been 
devolved, there were concerns very early on over the relationship between the Scottish Parliament 
and Scottish local government (see Bennett et al, 2002).  There is a perception of centralisation to 
Edinburgh, rather than London, although the relationship is not "a fuzzy microcosm" of that which 
exists in England (McGarvey, 2012).  The role and function of local government in Northern Ireland 
was minimal at this point in time.  In Wales, the plan was for a partnership between the devolved 
assembly, which had secondary legislative powers, and Welsh local government.  Laffin (2004) 
argued, guardedly, that regional centralisation was not likely to occur.  There were a number of 
caveats, including the need for there to be more than one party dominating power.  This issue will 
be revisited later. 
 
The devolution referendum in Wales in 1997 was not exactly a ringing endorsement of the policy.  
The campaigning was muted from all sides, unlike in Scotland where it was most vociferous.  Some 
of this could be attributed to the lack of powers being devolved to Wales.  One criticism was that the 
new Welsh Assembly would be little more than a glorified county council (Jones, 2014, 186).  This 
criticism had also been directed against the proposed devolved body in 1978.  The criticism persisted 
even after the powers of the Welsh Assembly were increased! 
 
Voting in Wales was held a week after the Scottish referendum on devolution; there was a clear 
hope from the Blair Government in London of creating a bandwagon effect.  The result saw a 
turnout of 50.2%, with 50.3% of those voting endorsing devolution: a majority of 6721 votes.  The 
results, reported by council authority, saw half the councils in Wales return a 'Yes' vote. 
 
The Government of Wales Act (1998) contained an entire section on "Relations with local 
government".  Specifically, Section 113 (2) noted: "The Assembly shall establish and maintain a body 
to be known as the Partnership Council for Wales".  While the plan was for a clear partnership, the 
Assembly was responsible for the management of local government in Wales.  The Partnership 
Council for Wales was established in 2000, with a clearly stated aim of promoting joint-working.  The 
Government of Wales Act (2006) restated the requirement for a partnership between the Welsh 
Government and local government.  This was reinforced with the Local Government Partnership 
Scheme (April 2008) and "A New Understanding" (November 2009), which were signed by the Welsh 
Government and the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA), and built upon the statutory 
partnership.  Interestingly, the Local Government Partnership Scheme acknowledged that Ministers 
could revise this scheme/partnership at any time, but only after consultation.  There was also a 
commitment towards partnership, trust and mutual respect.  Despite this seemingly positive 
relationship, a number of question marks arose over the governance structures of Wales.  Martin et 
al (2011, 92) described these structures as "overly complicated and overlapping".  There were also 
suggestions for a "wholesale reorganisation of local government" (98).  The same source noted, 
however, that centre-local relations were "reasonably harmonious" (107). 
 
This relationship appeared to change with the second referendum on devolution in Wales, 4 March 
2011, the result of which saw the law making powers moved from secondary to primary. 
 
More specifically, the second referendum proposed to transform the law making powers in the 
existing policy areas devolved to the Welsh Assembly from secondary to primary.  The referendum 
question demonstrated the complexity of the issue: Do you want the Assembly now to be able to 
make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?  There was an apparent 
resounding victory for the move to primary law making powers, with 63.9% of the population voting 
'Yes', and 21 of the 22 council areas returning 'Yes' results.  The caveat to this success was the 
turnout: 35.2%.   
 
The Welsh Government established the Simpson Review - "Local, Regional, National: What services 
are best delivered where?" - prior to the referendum on primary law making powers.  The Simpson 
Review focused on collaboration and joint-working between councils.  The emphasis was upon 
better quality of service delivery, as well as enhanced accountability.  There was no consideration of 
restructuring local government.  In fact, Principal 3: "It is about better collaboration not just 
geography" reinforced this position. Paragraph 2.16 noted: 
...not all collaborations need to be based on geographic proximity. Some will be based 
on geographic similarities. Coastal erosion is an important issue for coastal areas be they 
in north, west or south Wales, whilst urban planning expertise is something urban 
authorities might share irrespective of their geographic proximity. However, 
commonality of socio-economic conditions and service challenges also present a set of 
themes that can create a powerful common platform from which authorities can work. 
(Simpson, 2011, 15) 
 
The point to note here is that the Welsh Government was investigating the role and function of local 
government in Wales.  At this stage, there appeared to be negligible demand for restructuring of 
local government.  Partnerships and collaboration were of a higher priority.  Only two months later, 
during the Welsh Assembly election campaign, priorities changed.  The Welsh Labour Party 
committed itself to establishing an Independent Commission to review the governance and delivery 
arrangements of public services (Welsh Labour Manifesto 2011, 21), although there was a 
subsequent pledge to "place representation and community interests at the heart of any future 
boundary review" (28).  Party divisions will be examined later in this paper. 
 
The findings of the Williams Commission, with particular regard to local government, pushed for a 
radical overhaul of local government.  Arguments hinged around the cost savings of larger local 
authorities.  This being despite the evidence supporting the creation of larger local authorities for 
economic gain being far from conclusive, and the decline in democratic participation being 
considerable (see Copus and Jones, 2013; Copus and Jones, 2015).   
 
The Williams Report recommended the restructuring of local government across Wales, from 22 
local authorities to either 10, 11 or 12.  Williams left the final decision on the specific number with 
the Welsh Government.  The planned new local authorities would be created through the mergers of 
existing authorities.  It would be far less expensive than starting from a blank piece of paper.  The 
then-Minister for Local Government, Leighton Andrews, speculated on the creation through such 
mergers of only eight or nine local authorities for all of Wales, or even as few as six. 
 
The final imposition of new local government structures was left until after the 2016 elections to the 
Welsh Assembly.  With Labour failing to win outright, they were unable to find any coalition partners 
willing to support the planned restructuring of local government.  Thus, for now, the plans appear on 
hold. 
 
Although the dominance of the Welsh Government on local government restructuring is clear, the 
failure to push the proposed reforms from the Williams Commission raises a second question: that 
of the issue being party-led alongside being centrally-dominated. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the Commission on Public Service Governance and Delivery, the First 
Minister of Wales, Carwyn Jones, said talk of reorganisation of local government "was premature" 
(Iorwerth, 2013, 1) but that a "fundamental reorganisation may... be the way forward" (2). 
 
The proceedings in the Welsh Assembly with regard to the establishment of the Commission on 
Public Service Governance and Delivery, highlighted the degree of divisions between the political 
parties (available at www.assembly.wales/en/bus-home/pages/rop.aspx?meetingid=48#80025).  
The Williams Commission was perceived as being a partisan body.  In his statement to the Assembly, 
Carwyn Jones made two very clear points about the Commission.  He said: "the status quo is not an 
option"; and, "change is inevitable and essential".  The centre is clearly driving change; the issue is 
now around the extent of the party-politicisation of such restructuring. 
 
When asked by the leader of the Conservative Party in Wales, Andrew R T Davies, if he was wanting 
the Commission to make the case for local government reorganisation, Carwyn Jones responded: "I 
do not believe there is anyone... who believes that having 22 local authorities, with their present 
boundaries, is right for delivering local government services across Wales". 
 
Peter Black, a Liberal Democrat Assembly Member, speaking in the same debate, described the 
Williams Commission as "a Government commission", adding "the conclusions will be the ownership 
of the Government". 
 
Yet there were divisions among Labour ranks in this debate.  Mike Hedges, a Labour Assembly 
Member, questioned the First Minister over which local authorities in Wales had "serious problems" 
in delivering services?  At that point in time, only one council had such problems - Ynys Môn.  The 
response from Carwyn Jones was to focus on the effectiveness of the delivery of services rather than 
any specific problems. 
 
The establishment of the Williams Commission, with its planned consultations, gave a veneer of 
impartiality.  The reality was the Commission was established to push through plans to restructure 
local government.  Such plans would benefit one party more than any other: Labour. 
 
Anecdotal evidence from the WLGA Independent Councillors annual conference highlighted the 
extent to which they saw "Cardiff Bay" (as they termed the Welsh Government) imposing their plans 
on local government in Wales.  Ever since the establishment of the Williams Commission, these 
councillors have given vent to what they see as a far from subtle attack on the existence of 
Independent councillors in Wales.  Independent councillors, collectively, comprise the second largest 
grouping of councillors in Welsh local government.  Although they are far from being a cohesive 
body, they get lumped together.  They outnumber by a significant margin Plaid Cymru, who are the 
official opposition in the Welsh Assembly and the second largest 'party' of Welsh local government 
(see Jones, 2017).  There are currently no Independent Assembly Members (and only two 
Independent Assembly Members have ever been elected). 
 
Interestingly, perhaps, these same Independent councillors do not distinguish between the Welsh 
Government and the Labour Party.  The two are almost synonymous.  Such a perception is not 
unusual, noting Labour have formed the government (occasionally in coalition) after every election 
to the Welsh Assembly. 
 
When examining party manifestos, the issue of local government restructuring is far from 
prominent.  In the 2007 election manifestos, none of the political parties focused on restructuring 
local government, although both the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru campaigned for electoral 
reform at the local level, and have continued to do so. 
 
In the 2011 Assembly elections, Labour gave a commitment to establishing an Independent 
Commission to review the governance and delivery arrangements of public services.  As previously 
noted, this was to become the Williams Commission.  The Conservatives made no mention of local 
government restructuring, although they did campaign for local referenda for the introduction of 
elected mayors in the larger towns and cities of Wales - Cardiff, Swansea, Newport and Wrexham.  
Plaid Cymru, on the other hand, campaigned to develop better partnerships between councils and 
between councils and the Welsh Government, utilising a "memorandum of understanding between 
the Welsh Government and local government" (Plaid Cymru, 2011, 17).  The Liberal Democrats 
campaigned to repeal "the powers that allow Ministers to merge councils by decree without proper 
consultation with local people" (Welsh Liberal Democrats, 2011, 58).  Both Plaid Cymru and the 
Liberal Democrats appeared keen to devolve powers from the Welsh Government to local councils 
and community councils. 
 
In the most recent Assembly elections, with the plans to restructure local government placed on 
hold until after the campaign, there might be an expectation of this issue featuring prominently in 
the campaign.  Labour were quite blunt in their plans to carry their version of the Williams Report 
through.  They proposed "to create stronger, larger local authorities, as well as stronger town and 
community councils, leading to the devolution of powers from Cardiff Bay" (Welsh Labour, 2017, 
20).  The Liberal Democrats wanted to restart the whole process of consultation, and to "commission 
the Local Government and Boundary Commission to draw up alternative proposals for the 
restructuring of local councils in Wales" (Welsh Liberal Democrats, 2016, 57).  The Conservative 
proposals were not too dissimilar, wanting to "allow local authority mergers only with the expressed 
consent of the public through a referendum" (Welsh Conservative, 2016, 39).  Plaid Cymru proposed 
far more extensive plans about an evolutionary restructuring of local government, proposing the 
creation of "up to six regional combined authorities" (Plaid Cymru, 2016, 43) which would comprise 
existing councils.  These proposed RCAs would have directly-elected mayors. 
 
In sum, there was a clear lack of support for Labour's plans to restructure local government in Wales.  
It must be noted, however, that all major parties in Wales proposed some form of reform of local 
government - even with local consultation.  There is a clear situation of all of the major parties 
wishing to impose some form of new structure upon local government in Wales.  Of these parties, 
only Labour is ever likely to be in a position to implement their plans.  The problem for Labour is that 
none of the other parties are supportive of what Labour has done so far, or for the imposition of the 
Williams Commission proposals. 
 
The current situation has seen the Welsh Government introducing a new white paper on local 
government.  The plans are to change the electoral system - which will most likely be to the 
detriment of Independent councillors - and the creation of regional bodies to enhance cooperation 
between councils.  This may be Labour attempting a quid pro quo with the Liberal Democrats, but 
also the former-coalition partner, Plaid Cymru.  Currently, there is only one Liberal Democrat 
Assembly Member, and she had not been supportive of the findings of the Williams Commission.  
Previous experience from other tiers of government has seen the Liberal Democrats change a policy 
position in return for either electoral reform or a referendum on electoral reform.  What is not clear 
is the extent to which this proposal will be driven by the Welsh Government or by local government 
in Wales.  Plaid Cymru may move to support Labour, although they are still suffering from an 
electoral backlash against their time in coalition with Labour.  Labour appear to be playing a canny 
game, by proposing sweeteners to other political parties. 
 
Conclusion 
Noting the comment from Laffin (2004) that centralisation under devolution is less likely to occur 
when there is more than one party vying for power, the opposite appears to have happened in 
Wales.  There has been greater centralisation, with the Labour Party dominating each of the 
Assembly elections.  At each election, the outcome over who will win is between Labour and an anti-
Labour Rainbow coalition.  The latter has yet to succeed. 
 
When examining the extent to which the centre interferes in any restructuring of local government, 
the constitutional position of the UK must be borne in mind.  The UK has a unitary constitution: all 
power is centralised in Parliament.  Parliament can devolve powers to different parts of the UK, but 
such decisions can also be reversed.  Powers have been devolved to the elected regional bodies in 
Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, not to forget London.  A future Parliament could repeal such 
decisions.  As an aside, devolved powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly have been suspended on 
four separate occasions since 1998. 
 
When examining the development of devolution in Wales, the emphasis started with partnership.  
This was at the time of a devolved Assembly wielding the power of secondary legislation.  The 
change in the relationship occurred after the Assembly received primary law-making powers (in 
specific policy areas).  The partnership, with the Assembly as manager, changed.  The manager 
gained more powers, and had the desire to wield the power.  Thus there is a single party dominating 
Welsh politics, and a First Minister willing to pre-empt the results of a Commission examining public 
service delivery (including the structures of local government) by announcing what he did not want 
before the Commission had even been appointed. 
 
The Williams Commission was supposed to consult with the public.  While it did so, it appeared 
dismissive of any submissions which did not gel with their allegedly preconceived findings.  The 
Williams Commission was not an independent commission; rather, it was a government commission.  
It lacked the support of any parties not in government.  Instead, it gave the veneer of consultation, 
while the outcome fitted in with the desires of the government. 
 
This panel is focusing on central intrusion into local government restructuring.  In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the introduction of devolution saw 'control' over local authorities handed to the 
devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  In the case of Wales, the central body 
interfering in local government restructuring is no longer London; instead, it is Cardiff. 
 
Yet a caveat must be noted.  Rather than it being the 'centre' interfering in local government 
restructuring, the Welsh case study raises the possibility of the interference being party-political as 
opposed to structural, or, more likely, a combination of the two.  All of the major parties have ideas 
with regard to how local government should be structured.  While there is talk of consultation, the 
extent to which that actually happens can be questioned.  Thus, rather than focusing solely upon 
one institution interfering in local government restructuring, the partisan interference - especially in 
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